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Abstract
This Essay will describe synthetic lease financings and provide an analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages of these transactions for the acquisition or construction of a power generation
facility. During the past two years, several leading players in the power generation industry have
used “synthetic” leases to finance both the construction and acquisition of power generation assets,
as well as bulk purchases of combustion turbines. Synthetic leases can offer a tax and balance sheet
efficient alternative for the acquisition and construction of a power generation facility and related
equipment (collectively referred to in this Essay as a “power generation facility”). A synthetic
lease (also known by other names such as “off-balance sheet financing” or “tax oriented operating
lease”) is a financing transaction structured through a lease that satisfies the requirements for
characterization of a lease as an operating lease set forth in the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (“FASB”) Statement 13 (“SFAS 13”) and related accounting rules. Because a synthetic lease
allows a project sponsor to enjoy operating lease accounting treatments and avoid depreciation
charges attributable to the leased asset, power producers employing this technique may obtain
tangible economic advantages in the current market-driven environment. Synthetic lease financing
may also allow a project sponsor greater financial flexibility to participate in a number of large
scale projects and equipment purchases while mitigating the adverse credit impact of any particular
project or transaction. The execution of synthetic leasing transactions in the power generation
industry by leading players during the past two years may encourage others in the industry to
consider such innovative approaches.
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INTRODUCTION
The power industry in the United States is in the midst of
both fundamental change and new growth. The de-regulation
movement, which began in California in the mid-1990s1 and has
swept across the United States, 2 has caused a shake-up in the in-
dustry, including an unprecedented wave of utility mergers and
consolidations' and divestitures of utility-owned generation
* Mr. Fileti is a partner in the Los Angeles office of Morrison & Foerster LLP, and
Mr. Steen is a partner in the firm's Irvine, California office. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of their colleagues Jill Feldman and Stephen L. Feldman in
Morrison & Foerster's San Francisco office,Jude LeBlanc in the firm's Irvine office, and
Marc Young in the firm's Los Angeles office.
1. De-regulation in California began with Assembly Bill 1890 (AB1890), which was
signed into law on September 24, 1996. The new law established a four-year transition
period designed to implement competition in the energy sector. Rates were frozen at
the levels in effect as ofJune 10, 1996, and a ten percent rate reduction was guaranteed
for commercial and residential users, whose rates are to remain frozen until March 31,
2002, The new law also established an independent system operator and a legally sepa-
rate power exchange. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 9600 (Deering 2001).
2. As of March 5, 2001, the following 23 states (and the District of Columbia) had
enacted some form of restructuring legislation: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connect-
icut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. In addition, New York had issued a
comprehensive regulatory order and 18 states had ongoing commission or legislative
investigations, including Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRA-
TION, STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY AS OF MARCH 2001,
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chgstr/regmap.html. Although recent
difficulties with the deregulated market in California appear to be, at least in part,
unique to the deregulation program in California, it remains to be seen how much
these difficulties will result in a long-term retrenchment from deregulation in other
states.
3. From 1992 to April 2000, 35 mergers or acquisitions have been completed (and
12 were pending as of October 2000) between investor-owned utilities ("IOUs") or be-
tween IOUs and independent power producers ("IPPs"). These include such recent
deals as the US$33.3 billion American Electric Power Co., Inc./Central and South West
Corp. merger, the pending US$24.8 billion Consolidated Edison, Inc./Northeast Utili-
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plants.4 State de-regulation laws in some cases have mandated
the sales of utility-owned generation plants as a device to ensure
competition in the wholesale and retail electricity markets.5 The
favorable results of the initial divestitures, in which utilities were
able to monetize depreciated, old generating plants for high
multiples of book value, have provided a sufficient incentive
seemingly to open the floodgates.6 As a result, in the last several
years, generation assets have changed hands at unprecedented
levels.7
De-regulation has also led to entry and growth of many new
players in the power industry. Through development of new
power stations and acquisition of existing power generation, the
so-called independent power producers ("IPPs") have grown
into giants, which in many cases now rival or surpass the "regu-
lated" utility companies from which they were considered "inde-
pendent." Electric utility companies, while divesting assets in
their own service territories have, through affiliates, invested in
existing and new generating assets in the service territories of
other utilities.
What the architects of de-regulation seem not to. have ex-
pected, as the recent problems with de-regulation in California
have underscored, is how acute the nation's need is for new gen-
erating capacity.8 Although the jury is still out as to whether the
ties merger, the US$42.2 billion Unicorn Corporation (a holding company for Com-
monwealth Edison)/PECO Energy Co. merger, and the US$15.1 billion New Century
Energies/Northern States Power merger. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC
POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE (2000).
4. From late 1997 to April 2000, 51 IOUs had divested or were in the process of
divesting electricity generation assets for a total of 156.5 gigawatts of capacity, which
represents 22% of U.S. capacity. It is predicted that over the next 10 years, 50% of U.S.
capacity (approximately 364 gigawatts as of 1998) will change hands. Id. at 105.
5. This phenomenon may be tempered by the reaction of politicians to the recent
power crisis in California. On January 18, 2001, in response to the power crisis, the
Governor of California signed a bill into law prohibiting the sale of power generation
facilities owned by public utilities in the state until January 1, 2006. Ass. 6, 2000-2001
(Cal. 2001).
6. For example, in California, as of January 2000, IOUs had sold a total of 20,187
megawatts of generation assets for US$3.274 billion, a significant amount above their
book value of US$1.818 billion. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, ELECTRIC GENERATION
DIVESTITURE IN CALIFORNIA, at http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/divesture.html.
7. See generally Mclsaac et al., Financing the New Merchant Power Business, 6 J. PROJ.
FIN., Spring 2000, at 13.
8. The North American Reliability Council ("NERC") recently estimated that more
than 10,000 megawatts of capacity nationally will need to be added annually between
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de-regulation effort in its present form will survive, one point is
abundantly clear: there is a desperate need for new power gen-
eration in the United States.9 Demands for new capacity have
led to a surge in the planning and development of new power
generation facilities in the United States, ranging from dispersed
small, "peaking" generation programs and cogeneration or simi-
lar "distributed generation" facilities for self-supply to large-scale
natural gas-fired power stations in excess of several hundred
megawatts and costing hundreds of millions of dollars.' °
Industry restructurings often have led to financial innova-
tions, and the power industry is no exception. The model for
financing the development and acquisition of power plants has
changed significantly as the wholesale and retail power markets
have evolved during the more than twenty years since the pas-
sage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.11 The
"project financing" model-once characterized by long-term
commercial bank and bond financings (e.g., twenty years) based
on similarly long-term, guaranteed-price power purchase agree-
ments entered into with creditworthy utilities-has evolved.12
With the rise of more volatile market-based pricing systems and
the onset of so-called "merchant" power plants13 during the past
the years 2000 and 2008 in order to keep up with a 1.8% annual growth in demand for
power. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, MAKING COMPETITION WORK: BUILDING ELECTRIC
GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION TO MEET SPIRALING DEMAND, at http://www.eei.org/is-
sues/comp-reg/pricevolatility0l .pdf.
9. The Energy Information Administration ("EIA") in the Annual Energy Outlook
2001 projected that 1,310 new plants with a combined total of 393 gigawatts of capacity
will need to be built by 2020. ENERGY INFORMATION ASSOCIATION, UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2001 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2020, at 73
(2000).
10. It is estimated that the merchant generation market will grow to 160 gigawatts
before the end of 2001, with US$20 billion being slated for investment in power
projects through 2001 and about six to 10 deals worth US$5 billion expected to be
closed each year. See Andreas Campomar, The Shape of Synths to Come, J. PROJ. FIN., July
1, 2000, at 37.
11. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1998).
12. Through the 1990s, new power generation assets were developed using the
traditional project finance model. In a basic project finance transaction, the financing
is non-recourse or limited recourse with the lenders looking principally to the cash flow
of an individual project as security for their loan. See MichaelJ. Schewel, Jurassic Sparks!
Project Finance Revives Extinct Deals, 12 APR PROB. & PROP. 26, 26 (Mar./Apr. 1998).
13. The term "merchant power plant" refers to the project that largely or entirely
depends on the wholesale or retail marketplace to sell power, rather than one or more
long-term power purchase agreements.
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decade, financing the acquisition and construction of power
generation facilities has come to include a range of products and
transaction structures involving varying degrees of "recourse," in-
cluding cross-collateralized portfolio financings, quasi-public of-
ferings of debt and equity, securitizations, and leveraged and
other lease financings. t4
The confluence of increased merger and acquisition activ-
ity, new players, and the demands for new generating capacity
has created a tremendous need for new capital and innovative
financing products and structures. As the power industry has be-
come more competitive, project sponsors are interested in ex-
ploring ways to enjoy economies of scale, reduce equipment and
financing costs, and, where possible, take full advantage of
favorable accounting and tax treatment. In addition, in light of
price volatility and possible supply interruptions, end users may
be interested in developing their own sources of generation.
This particularly may be the case for large energy users (such as
chemical concerns, oil refiners, paper makers, semiconductor
manufacturers, and others) that are seeking to supply some por-
tion of their electrical needs outside the market-based pricing
system and without risk of costly power interruptions, but which
are not principally engaged in the business of energy produc-
tion."
During the past two years, several leading players in the
power generation industry have used "synthetic" leases to fi-
nance both the construction and acquisition of power genera-
tion assets, as well as bulk purchases of combustion turbines.
Synthetic leases can offer a tax and balance sheet efficient alter-
native for the acquisition and construction of a power genera-
tion facility and related equipment (collectively referred to in
this Essay as a "power generation facility"). A synthetic lease
14. See Mclsaac et al., supra note 7; Watkins, Cross Dressing, J. PROJ. FIN., Nov. 1,
1999.
15. This Essay focuses on the use of synthetic leasing by IPPs and end users, as
opposed to regulated utilities. Although the use of synthetic lease financing by regu-
lated utilities may be appropriate in some instances, the special regulatory and account-
ing concerns that relate to capital investments and leases by regulated utilities raise
potential issues that are beyond the scope of this Essay. In addition, this Essay focuses
on the use of synthetic leasing as a means of financing electric generating facilities, as
opposed to transmission or distribution facilities. Transmission and distribution ser-
vices continue to be highly regulated and the regulatory and accounting regimes that
govern those services raise issues that are beyond the scope of this Essay.
SYNTHETIC LEASE FINANCING
(also known by other names such as "off-balance sheet financ-
ing" or "tax oriented operating lease") is a financing transaction
structured through a lease that satisfies the requirements for
characterization of a lease as an operating lease set forth in the
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") Statement 13
("SFAS 13") and related accounting rules.1 6 Because a synthetic
lease allows a project sponsor to enjoy operating lease account-
ing treatment and avoid depreciation charges attributable to the
leased asset, power producers employing this technique may ob-
tain tangible economic advantages in the current market-driven
environment. Synthetic lease financing may also allow a project
sponsor greater financial flexibility to participate in a number of
large scale projects and equipment purchases while mitigating
the adverse credit impact of any particular project or transac-
tion." The execution of synthetic leasing transactions in the
power generation industry by leading players during the past two
years may encourage others in the industry to consider such in-
novative approaches. This Essay will describe synthetic lease
financings and provide an analysis of the advantages and disad-
vantages of these transactions for the acquisition or construction
of a power generation facility.
I. RECENT SYNTHETIC LEASE TRANSACTIONS IN THE
POWER INDUSTRY
Starting in the 1990s, public companies in the high-tech
and biotech fields financed the acquisition of manufacturing
plants, headquarters buildings, corporate campuses, and other
"strategic" real estate assets using synthetic lease financing.
Other public companies involved in manufacturing, retail, and
other lines of business have also used this technique."i
Recently, synthetic lease transactions have been employed
in the power industry, including the following transactions:
16. SFAS 13 and other Statements of Financial Accounting Standards are pub-
lished in FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, FASB
STATEMENTS OF STANDARDS 1-100, Vols. I & 11 (2000) [hereinafter ORIGINAL PRONOUNCE-
MENTS]. A comparison publication, CURRENT TEXT, GENERAL STANDARDS AND INDUSTRY
STANDARDS, Vols. I & II (2000) [hereinafter CURRENT TEXT], integrates currently effec-
tive accounting and reporting standards.
17. See Campomar, supra note 10.
18. See Andrew Ratner & Steve Marcussen, The Synthetic Lease Strategy, CORP. REAL
ESTATE EXECUTIVE (Sept. 1996); David Holmes, The Use of Synthetic Leases to Finance Build-
to-Suit Transactions, REAL ESTATE FIN. J. (Winter 1996).
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" PG&E National Energy Group ("PG&E") completed syn-
thetic lease financings of two large-scale, merchant power
projects. The first, in September 1999, was a well-publi-
cized US$490 million project-financed synthetic lease of
the "Lake Road" project, a 792 MW natural gas-fired
power station in Killingly, Connecticut. 9 This project-fi-
nanced synthetic lease included a US$227 million securi-
tized commercial paper facility, a US$219 million term
loan, US$15 million in working capital, a US$15 million
letter of credit, and US$13.8 million in certificates.20
" PG&E completed a second similar US$730 million project-
financed synthetic lease for its 1,048 megawatt La Paloma
generating facility in Kern County, California, in March
2000.21 The financing included a US$25 million debt ser-
vice reserve facility, US$15 million in Working capital,
US$374 million in PG&E Corporation-backed commercial
paper, US$295 million term financing, and US$21 million
in certificates.22
* Prior to PG&E's transactions, Mississippi Power, a subsidi-
ary of Southern Company, completed a US$406 million
synthetic lease financing in April 1999, the commercial
paper for which was immediately oversubscribed. 2 The
deal was broken down into four tranches, consisting of a
fixed-rate 22.5-year bullet at US$270 million, a US$71 mil-
lion floating-rate piece with a 12.5-year final maturity and
a 7.5-year average life, a 12.5-year bullet US$50 million
piece, and a subordinated tranche for US$15 million is-
sued as a 22.5-year bullet.24
19. The transaction's Lead Arranger was Citibank, and Arranger and Co-Arranger
were SociCt G~n~rale and Deutsche Bank, respectively. There were 17 additional lend-
ers, contributing to an oversubscription in syndication. See Press Release, PG&E Gener-
ating (Sept. 8, 1999), at http://www.usgen.com/news/LakeRoadFinancing.htm.
20. The commercial paper is acting as an equity bridge with PG&E guaranteeing
roughly 50% of the total debt. The commercial paper facility is expected to be renewed
annually and to eventually be taken out with equity from PG&E. The US$219 million
term loan has a tenor of construction (two years) plus sixteen years. See Lake Road
Oversubscribed, PROJ. FIN. INT'L, Sept. 8, 1999, at 33.
21. The transaction's arrangers were Citibank, Societe Gincrale, and Deutsche
Bank. Co-arrangers were BNP Paribas Group, Credit Lyonnais, and Dresdner Kleinwort
Benson. There were 23 additional lenders, contributing to an oversubscription in syn-
dication. See Press Release, PG&E Generating (Mar. 30, 2000), at http://
www.usgen.com/news/033000finance.htm.
22. See Campomar, supra note 10.
23. See Mississippi Power Turns Market On, 9 PRIVATE PLACEMENT REP., Apr. 5, 1999,
at 2.
24. Id.
SYNTHETIC LEASE FINANCING
In May 1999, KeySpan Energy Corporation announced a
synthetic lease financing for the Brooklyn Union Gas
Ravenswood generating facility in Queens, New York.25
Under the terms of the transaction, the bondholders ob-
tained a secured interest in the lease for the facility, with
the deal being broken down into two tranches: a
US$412.25 million senior portion and a US$12.75 million
equity tranche, having an initial term of five years with an
option to renew. 26 Although Brooklyn Gas leases the facil-
ity, KeySpan guaranteed the lease.27
Synthetic leases have also been used recently to finance ad-
vance purchases of turbines and other major equipment items.2"
In October 2000, PG&E announced a US$7.8 billion synthetic
lease financing in a "master turbine trust" transaction involving
the purchase of forty-four turbines and the construction of fif-
teen associated projects, representing a total of 13,700 MW.
The transaction combined a synthetic lease with a trust struc-
ture, aggregating PG&E's financing needs into a single vehicle.3 °
Under the terms of the transaction, the turbines will be ware-
housed and owned by a trust (one trust for twenty-three General
Electric turbines and one trust for twenty-one Mitsubishi tur-
bines), with the turbines pledged to the lenders as collateral
against any uncovered risks.31 PG&E was hired by the trust as
the construction agent to build the plants that will house the
turbines.32 The trusts have a US$7.5 billion tranche that is
backed by U.S. Treasuries pledged by PG&E, a smaller tranche
based on PG&E Corporation-backed credit, and an equity
tranche represented by certificates of ownership for the tur-
bines.33
The magnitude and variety of the synthetic lease transac-
tions that have been consummated to date in the power industry
25. See KeySpan Raises the Bar, 11 PRIVATE PLACEMENT RI'., May 3, 1999, at 1.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Dynegy Inc. completed a US$200 million synthetic lease for the purchase of
turbines and Enron completed a similar US$500 million synthetic lease. See Turbine
Deals Oust the Lease, PROJ. FIN. INT'L, July 26, 2000, at 11.
29. See Innovative Financing Highlights PG&E's $7.8 Billion Deal with Socigtg Gbnzfale,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Oct. 2, 2000, at 9.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
108920011
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reflect the potential viability of this form of financing for the
acquisition and construction of power generation facilities.
II. THE BENEFITS OF SYNTHETIC LEASING
The benefits of off-balance sheet financing to the lessee, as
compared to traditional debt arrangements, are several-fold.
These benefits primarily result from differences in how leases
are characterized for tax purposes under the Internal Revenue
Code and for book purposes under the standards of the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"). In general, and as
discussed more fully below, for tax purposes, the lessee of an
asset that is financed under a synthetic lease is treated as the
owner of the asset for tax purposes and the lease is viewed as a
financing for tax purposes. Thus, the lessee will enjoy the cash
flow benefits of tax depreciation deductions on the leased asset
and can deduct the interest component of the rent it pays under
the lease. However, for accounting purposes, the lessee is
viewed not as the owner, but merely as a lessee renting an asset.
In its income statement, the lessee thus avoids the reduction of
earnings that would be attributable to book depreciation of the
leased asset. Both the leased asset and the liability of the lessee
under the lease remain off the lessee's balance sheet, the book
depreciation of the asset remains off the lessee's income state-
ment, and the lessee's rental payments will be reflected as oper-
ating expenses on its income statement. (However, the transac-
tion may be footnoted in the lessee's financial statement 4 and, if
the lessee is a reporting company, it may have certain disclosure
obligations relating to the transaction under the Securities Ex-
change Commission rules if the lease represents a material trans-
action 5.3 ) In addition to these tax and accounting benefits, a
synthetic lease, like other lease financing transactions, repre-
sents an opportunity to finance one hundred percent of acquisi-
tion or construction costs. 36
34. H. Peter Nesvold, What are you Trying to Hide? Synthetic Leases, Financial Disclo-
sure and the Information Mosaic, 4 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 83, 93 (1999).
35. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13 and 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a et seq.
(1934). Rule 13a-11 and Rule 15d-11 were issued by the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion and Form 8-K promulgated thereunder. See id.
36. Leveraged leases are also a financing technique that has been employed in
connection with the acquisition of power generation facilities. In a leveraged lease,
unlike a synthetic lease, the lessor will be viewed as the tax owner of the asset and thus a
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The tax and accounting benefits of synthetic lease transac-
tions can be very attractive to "balance sheet-sensitive" compa-
nies, particularly those that can make efficient use of the tax
benefits of the asset. A public company or a company that is
seeking to go public and that has entered into a synthetic lease
will be able, when it sells its stock, to avoid the depressive effects
on its earnings of book depreciation of the leased asset, and
thereby enhance book income and the price that it may obtain
for its stock, since that price is usually expressed as a multiple of
earnings.
Companies (whether public or private) that are subject to
financial covenants in indentures or credit agreements (e.g.,
such as requirements for minimum net worth, maximum ratio of
debt to net worth, minimum profitability, or a minimum ratio of
earnings to fixed charges or of liquid assets to current liabilities)
also find synthetic leases attractive. They may be able to engage
in a synthetic lease financing without running afoul of such cove-
nants, whereas a financing that would be regarded as a liability
under generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") might
result in a violation of those covenants or "use up" capacity
under those covenants, since those covenants are usually con-
structed based on GAAP classification of earnings, assets, and lia-
bilities. In addition, companies seeking to preserve their corpo-
rate cash or revenues for their core lines of business will benefit
from the one hundred percent financing features of the transac-
tion.
These transactions are not without disadvantages, however.
The typical synthetic lease is a medium-term financing, and fi-
leveraged lease will involve a lessor entity that can use tax benefits such as depreciation
more efficiently than the lessee can. The lease may or may not qualify as an operating
lease, depending on whether it satisfies the operating lease tests in SFAS 13 and
whether the lease is the result of a sale-leaseback transaction. Leveraged lease transac-
tions involving power generation facilities include transactions entered into by PG&E
Generating New England (lease of the Bear Swamp pumped storage facility acquired
from New England Electric), AES Eastern Energy (acquisition of NYSEG coal plants),
PP&L Montana (acquisition of fossil and hydro plants in Montana), and Edison Mission
Midwest Holdings (lease of the Collins plant, which is part of the US$4.8 billion acquisi-
tion of 9,510 megawatts of fossil assets from Commonwealth Edison, the largest genera-
tion acquisition in the United States to date). See Mclsaac, supra note 7. CIT Group
recently structured a US$400 leveraged lease financing for Calpine Corporation for
both Phase I and Phase II of its Pasadena, Texas cogeneration project. See CITfunds
Calpine, PROJ. FIN. INT'L, Sept. 20, 2000, at 21; see also Eric Lammers, De-regulation
Reinventing Generation Planning and Finance, ELECTRIc LIGHT & POWER (Nov. 1999).
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nancing a long-term asset such as a power generation facility
with a medium-term liability flies in the face of conventional wis-
dom that a long-term asset should be financed with a long-term
liability. Additionally, synthetic leases can involve high up-front
advisory, accounting, and legal fees and other transaction costs.
Structuring a synthetic lease for construction of a power genera-
tion facility requires compliance with a myriad of accounting
rules, which can make underwriting the transaction difficult
from the financing sources viewpoint.37 Further, because a syn-
thetic lease (especially one in which real estate improvements,
rather than equipment, form the primary asset) can involve rela-
tively low amortization, the lessee may need to seek to "refi-
nance" a substantial balance upon the expiration of its term. Al-
though this feature in certain respects is not substantially differ-
ent from the need to refinance the unpaid balance of a
financing at its maturity, certain accounting challenges and addi-
tional transaction costs can be encountered in refinancing or
unwinding a synthetic lease that would not necessarily arise in
traditional financings, especially if the lessee seeks to preserve
the off-balance sheet treatment of the asset in a new transaction.
Some of these disadvantages are addressed more fully below.
III. FASB REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CHARACTERIZATION
OF LEASES
The accounting benefits of synthetic leasing depend upon
characterization of the transaction as an operating lease-and
not a capital lease-under SFAS 13 and related accounting stan-
dards that set forth the criteria that apply to the characterization
of a lease for book purposes. Under SFAS 13, accounting for
leases is derived from the view that a lease that transfers substan-
tially all of the benefits and risks of ownership should be ac-
counted for as the acquisition of an asset and the incurrence of
an obligation by the lessee (a capital lease), and any other lease
should be accounted for as an operating lease (that is, the rental
of property).3
In determining whether a lease transfers all of the benefits
and risks of ownership to the lessee, however, SFAS 13 adopts a
"cookbook" approach, rather than an "all the facts and circum-
37. See Healey, Turbine Deals Oust the Lease, PROJ. FIN. INT'L, July 26, 2000.
38. See CURRENT TEXT, supra note 16, at 29141.
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stances"-type test. In particular, SFAS 13 identifies several crite-
ria that are solely determinative of the characterization of a
lease. If a lease meets any of the criteria identified in SFAS 13, it
will be classified as a capital lease. If a lease is characterized as a
capital lease, the leased asset and the lease obligation are re-
corded as an asset and a liability, respectively, on the lessee's bal-
ance sheet and depreciation of the leased asset will be reflected
on the lessee's income statement. Thus, from an accounting
standpoint, in order to qualify as an operating lease, the transac-
tion must be structured to avoid all of the SFAS 13 criteria. A
description of the primary SFAS 13 criteria, and how they are
avoided in a typical synthetic lease transaction, is set forth be-
low.39
SFAS 13 CRITERIA APPLICATION TO A
FOR LEASES SYNTHETIC LEASE
If the lease transfers ownership This criterion is not met in a
of the leased asset to the lessee synthetic lease because the lease
at the end of the leased term, will not provide for the transfer
the lease will be characterized of ownership of the property
as a capital lease.40  upon the expiration of the term
of the lease.
39. The description of the SFAS 13 tests in this Essay is summary. The tests include
some requirements that are very technical in nature. The full text of SFAS 13 can be
found in 1 ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 16, at 98-145. In addition to SFAS
13, there are several other Statements of Financial Accounting Standards, bulletins, and
pronouncements that FASB or its Emerging Issues Task Force ("EITF") (a key working
group that studies and addresses concerns of the financial accounting community)
have issued that impact the accounting for synthetic leases. These include
(i) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 94 (1987)-Consolidation of all Ma-
jority-Owned Subsidiares, (ii) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 98-Ac-
counting for Leases: Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate, Sale-Type
Leases of Real Estate, Definition of the Lease Term, and Initial Direct Costs of Direct
Financing Leases, (iii) EITF Bulletin 90-15-Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors,
Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in Leasing Transactions, (iv) EITF
Bulletin 90-8-Implementation Issues in Accounting for Leasing Transactions Involving
Special-Purpose Entities, (v) EITF Bulletin 96-21-Implementation Issues Associated
with EITF 90-15, (vi) EITF Bulletin 97-1-Implementation Issues in Accounting for
Lease Transactions, Including Those Involving Special-Purpose Entities, (vii) EITF Bul-
letin 97-10-The Effect of Lessee Involvement in Asset Construction, and (viii) Finan-
cial Accounting Series No. 194-B-Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards, Consolidated Financial Statements: Purpose and Policy (Exposure Draft) (Feb.
23, 1999).
40. See Accounting for Leases, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
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SFAS 13 CRITERIA APPLICATION TO A
FOR LEASES SYNTHETIC LEASE
If the lease contains an option This criterion is not met in a
to purchase the leased property synthetic lease because the
at a bargain price (i.e., a price lessee will not have a bargain
that "is sufficiently lower than option.
the expected fair value of the
property at the date the option
becomes exercisable that
exercise of the option appears,
at the inception of the lease, to
be reasonably assured"), the
lease will be characterized as a
capital lease.
41
If the lease term is equal to or This criterion is not met in a
greater than seventy-five percent synthetic lease because the lease
of the estimated economic life will include a sufficiently short
of the leased property or more term.
of the useful life of the leased
property, the lease will be
characterized as a capital
lease.4 2
13, § 7a (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1976); ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra
note 16, at 101.
41. SFAS 13, §§ 5d, 7b. See ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 16, at 99, 101.
In applying the bargain option test, some accounting firms take the view that a bargain
option for certain real estate assets can be avoided only if the lease term has a minimum
length, even if the purchase price for the asset equals its cost or objectively-determined
fair market value. For example, in the case of a manufacturing plant, some accounting
firms take the view that the lease term must be at least five years in order to avoid a
bargain option. The principle at work in this analysis appears to be that a
manufacturing plant that is important to the lessee's business may have a subjective
value to the lessee that is greater to it than the fair market value or cost of the asset
would indicate. Thus, unless the lease term is sufficiently long, the accountants would
be concerned that exercise of the option would, as of the inception of the lease, be
"reasonably assured" and the bargain option test would not be satisfied.
42. SFAS 13, § 7c. See ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 16, at 101.
SFAS 13 CRITERIA APPLICATION TO A
FOR LEASES SYNTHETIC LEASE
If the present value at the
beginning of the lease term of
the "minimum lease
payments"4 3 equals or exceeds
ninety percent of the fair value
of the leased property to the
lessor at the inception of the
lease, the lease will be
characterized as a capital lease.
(This test is referred to in this
Essay as the "Ninety Percent
Test.") The lessee computes
the present value of the
minimum lease payments using
its incremental borrowing rate
(i.e., the rate that, at the
inception of the lease, the
lessee would have incurred if it
had borrowed over a similar
term the funds necessary to
purchase the leased asset)."
The lessee's rental payment
obligations and end-of-term
purchase and residual value
guaranty obligations (described
more fully below) in a synthetic
lease will be structured to avoid
this criterion.
Certain special rules apply in the case of a lease involving
both land and improvements if the fair value of the land is
twenty five percent or more of the total fair value of the leased
property at the inception of the lease. These rules make avoid-
ance of capital lease classification more difficult in these circum-
stances.45 Special rules also apply where the lease involves both
43. SFAS 13 defines "minimum lease payments" as the payments that the lessee is
obligated to make or can be required to make in connection with the leased property.
However, the lessee's obligation to pay executory costs such as insurance, maintenance,
and taxes in connection with the leased property is excluded. Minimum lease payments
include the minimum rental payments called for by the lease, plus any guarantee by the
lessee (or a third party related to the lessee) of the residual value at the expiration of
the lease term and any payment that the lessee is required to make upon failure to
renew or extend the lease at the expiration of the lease term, whether or not the
guaranty or such other payments are structured as consideration for the purchase of
the leased property. SFAS 13, § 5j. See ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 16, at
100.
44. SFAS 13, § 7d. See ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 16, at 101-02.
45. SFAS 13, § 26. See ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 16, at 107-08. In
this Essay, we will assume that the value of the land leased with the power generation
facility does not exceed this 25% threshold. Separate "land only" or "improvements
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real estate and equipment (which would not be unusual in a syn-
thetic lease, particularly one involving a power generation facil-
ity), but these rules generally do not impede the classification of
the lease as an operating lease.4 6
In addition to the SFAS 13 tests, under FASB consolidation
principles, if the lessor is a "non-substantive lessor" or is a special
purpose entity that will be consolidated into the lessee for ac-
counting purposes, the assets and liabilities of the lessor will be
included on the lessee's balance sheet, thereby eliminating the
favorable accounting treatment. To avoid characterization as a
"non-substantive lessor," the lessor must be capitalized with a
minimum, subordinate equity capitalization of at least three per-
cent.4 7 Under recent proposed accounting standards concern-
ing consolidation, even if the lessor is initially a single asset en-
tity, consolidation may be avoided if the lessor has the organiza-
tional powers (whether or not exercised), without a veto right on
the part of the lessee, to engage in transactions other than own-
ership of the leased asset.48 FASB continues to review consolida-
tion issues, however, and thus this area remains an area of poten-
tial risk in structuring transactions.
Despite FASB's "cookbook" approach to the characteriza-
tion of leases, the accounting profession has subjected synthetic
leases to significant scrutiny. FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force
("EITF") has reviewed several issues arising from synthetic lease
transactions. EITF 97-1 provides that leases that include "subjec-
tive" events of default, the occurrence of which could trigger an
obligation on the part of the lessee to make a one hundred per-
cent guaranteed residual value payment (rather than the less-
than-ninety percent payments permissible under the Ninety Per-
cent Test absent a default), must be characterized as capital
only" leases can sometimes be utilized to address the constraints introduced by this 25%
test.
46. SIAS 13, § 27. See ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 16, at 108.
47. See EITF Bulletins 9-15, 96-21, 97-1; EITF Topic No. D-14.
48. See Financial Accounting Series No. 194-B, Proposed Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards, Consolidated Financial Statements: Purpose and Policy (Expo-
sure Draft) (Feb. 23, 1999), Example 8 (Creation of a Special-Purpose Trust to Invest in
(Lease) Real Estate) §§ 141-52. FASB has received extensive comments on the Expo-
sure Draft and has made certain tenative decisions in the course of its deliberations
concerning that draft. The FASB website includes certain information concerning the
status of the Exposure Draft. The website is available at www.fasb.org.
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leases rather than operating leases.49 EITF 97-10, which is de-
scribed in more detail below, requires characterization of a lease
as a capital lease if the lessee has borne substantially all of the
risks of the construction of the leased asset. The impact of the
current consolidation project involves a further effort to ensure
that the lessor party and its funding sources bear some risk in
these transactions, in order for the lessor to be considered the
"true" owner for book purposes.50
IV. TAX CHARACTERIZATION OF SYNTHETIC LEASES
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") have
addressed many times the question of whether a transaction de-
nominated as a lease will be treated as a "true lease" (in which
the party denominated as lessor is treated as the owner/lessor of
the equipment and the party denominated as lessee is treated as
the lessee) or as a financing, i.e., a loan or conditional sale (in
which the party denominated as lessor is treated as a secured
lender or secured vendor and the party denominated as lessee is
treated as a borrower that owns the equipment). The IRS and
the courts have generally applied a substance-over-form analysis
in determining who is the owner of the leased asset in a pur-
ported leasing transaction. The principal test applied in deter-
mining ownership for tax purposes is which party bears the eco-
nomic benefits and burdens of ownership. 1 The IRS has issued
published guidelines describing situations in which an agree-
ment that is in the form of a lease will be treated as a conditional
sale. 2 Revenue Rule 55-540 sets forth a list of conditions, which,
if one or more are present, absent compelling contrary persuasive
factors, warrant the conclusion that the parties intended to enter
into a conditional sale rather than a true lease. The factors in-
clude whether (i) some portion of the periodic payments is spe-
cifically designated as interest or is otherwise readily recogniza-
49. Emerging Issues Task Force of the Financial Accounting Standards Board Issue
No. 97-1: Implementation Issues in Accounting for Lease Transactions, Including
Those Involving Special-Purpose Entities [hereinafter EITF 97-1].
50. Emerging Issues Task Force of the Financial Accounting Standards Board Issue
No. 97-10: The Effect of Lease Involvement in Asset Construction [hereinafter 97-10].
51. See generally Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Hilton v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), afJfd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982); Don-
ald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: Structured Finance, Financial Accounting and Tax Owner-
ship, 25 IowAJ. CORP. L. 445 (2000).
52. See Rev. Rule 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 41.
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ble as the equivalent of interest and (ii) the rental payments and
any option price payable in addition thereto approximates the
price at which the leased asset could have been acquired by
purchase at the time of entering into the agreement, plus inter-
est and/or carrying charges. In a synthetic lease transaction,
both of these factors are present.
Many transactions denominated as leases are triple-net
leases, in which, during the lease term, the lessee bears all the
economic burdens of ownership (i.e., maintenance and repair,
expense of operation including insurance, risk of casualty, in-
demnification for tax, and other liabilities arising from owner-
ship or operation). The lessee also realizes the benefits of own-
ership through the use of the property in its business while the
lessor's benefit from the property is limited to the receipt of
fixed rental payments. In analyzing triple-net leases, the courts
and the IRS have focused on whether a substantial anticipated
residual value of the leased property is available to the lessor at
the end of the lease term, so that the lessor's actual economic
return from the transaction will be influenced by the property's
actual residual value.53 These Revenue Procedures consider,
among other factors, whether the lessor or lessee has a substan-
tial investment in the property, whether the property is expected
to have a substantial residual value and remaining useful life at
the end of the lease term, and whether purchase options, put
rights, or renewal rights at the end of the lease term impair the
lessor's right to enjoy the residual value or transfer to the lessee
the risk of any decline in the expected residual value.
Determining who bears the economic benefits and burdens
of ownership requires an examination of the entire transaction.
This examination will reflect that in a typical synthetic lease
transaction, as will be indicated in more detail below:
" The lessee makes rental payments that are the equivalent
of interest payments.
" The lessee has operational control over the property and
assumes nearly all of the economic risks and burdens in-
herent in the property.
* The lessee has an option to purchase the property at its
cost (and not a nominal amount). While the absence of a
bargain option would normally indicate a "true" lease, the
53. See Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715; Rev. Proc. 75-28, 1975-1 C.B. 752.
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option amount recovers for the lessor all unamortized
principal it has advanced. If the lessee does not renew the
lease or exercise its purchase option, it is required to ar-
range for a sale of the real estate. If the real estate is sold
for more than the amount of the purchase option, the
lessee receives the excess. If the property is sold for less
than the amount of the purchase option, the lessee is re-
quired to make a substantial residual value guaranty pay-
ment so that the lessor bears only a ten percent residual
value risk. Thus, the combined effect of the option, re-
newal rights, and residual value guaranty obligations of
the lessee allocate to the lessee the benefits of upside ap-
preciation and the risks of a decline in the residual value
of the lease asset, except to the extent of a decline in the
value of the property to ten percent or less of the prop-
erty's original cost.
In light of these features, tax practitioners active in this area
seem comfortable in concluding that the lessee should be
respected as the owner for income tax purposes. Certainly, the
tax characterization of the transaction as a financing would be
enhanced if the documentation for a synthetic lease reflected an
express intent of the parties to treat the lessee as the tax owner,
and obligated all parties to report the transaction consistently.
V. TYPICAL STRUCTURE OF SYNTHETIC LEASES
In its simplest form, a synthetic lease can be structured as a
"single investor" lease, involving the acquisition of the power
generation facility by an investor and the lease of the power gen-
eration facility to the lessee. While single investor transactions
may be appropriate for certain equipment transactions and have
been used for certain real estate facilities, a single investor trans-
action is unlikely to be the primary form for a synthetic lease
involving a power generation facility, as the costs involved in the
acquisition or construction of a power generation facility will ex-
ceed the amount that one investor likely would be prepared to
commit to a transaction. Because these costs are substantial, the
more likely form for a synthetic lease involving a power genera-
tion facility will be a syndicated transaction, in which a group of
different funding sources collectively will provide the debt and
equity needed for the transaction. Although a single investor
lease is unlikely to be encountered in connection with the acqui-
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sition or construction of a power generation facility, this Essay
will describe the basic structural elements first of a typical single
investor lease and then of a typical syndicated transaction, as
they share many common structural features, and understanding
how a single investor lease operates will facilitate the under-
standing of the syndicated transaction.
In a typical single investor lease involving a real estate facil-
ity, the lessor entity will acquire the facility and all associated
personal property and then lease it to the lessee for a specified
term. If the transaction is being used for construction of a new
facility, the lessor will acquire an interest in the land and make
advances to the lessee during the construction period for con-
struction costs (including, in certain cases, capitalized internal
labor costs), construction-period carrying costs (including inter-
est or rent), and transaction costs and then, once the facility is
completed, lease the facility to the lessee for a specified term.
Synthetic leases typically involve medium-range terms.
"Single Investor" Structure for Acquisition of
Plant
Equity
Holder
Advances for 100% of acquisition
and transaction costs -- minimum
3% equity
.A Plant.
Lessor Seller
Advances to LesseePurchase Price Seller
for transaction Interest-only rent payments;
costs 3 End-of-term purchase price payment from$ Lessee or third party if purchase option is
exercised;
End-of-term residual value guaranty payments
from Lessee capped at less than 90%* of leaseLessee balance if sale option is exercised
*See footnote 18.
The lease will include terms standard for a "hell-or-high-
water" triple-net lease. Thus, the lessee will be obligated to pay
all property and other taxes on the facility; to insure the facility;
and to pay for all utilities, maintenance, and repairs; and the
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lessor will disclaim any warranties regarding the condition of the
facility. In addition, the lease will typically include certain finan-
cial, affirmative, and negative "enterprise" covenants that would
be typical for an unsecured corporate credit facility. Depending
on the particular case, these financial and enterprise covenants
could include such covenants as a minimum net worth require-
ment, a maximum ratio of debt to net worth, minimum profit-
ability, a minimum ratio of earnings to fixed charges or of liquid
assets to current liabilities, as well as limits on investments, asset
sales, mergers and acquisitions, liens, and changes in the control
of the lessee. The lease will include obligations on the part of
the lessee to deliver quarterly and annual financial reports and
other periodic information. The lease will also typically include
garden-variety covenants regarding corporate housekeeping,
such as those requiring the lessee to pay income and other taxes
assessed against the lessee, to remain in good standing, to com-
ply with all applicable laws, and to maintain customary insurance
for the lessee's business. If the true creditworthy party in the
transaction is a parent corporation of the lessee, the parent cor-
poration will provide a guaranty of the obligations of the lessee,
and these financial and enterprise covenants would be applica-
ble to the parent. The lease may also include cross-default provi-
sions under which a default under other material credit agree-
ments of the lessee would result in a default under the lease.
VI. RENTAL AND RESIDUAL VALUE GUARANTY
OBLIGATIONS OF THE LESSEE
The lessee's rental payment obligations are typically the
equivalent of debt service payments (frequently based on a
spread over the London Inter-bank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") or a
comparable index) on the acquisition and other costs advanced
by the lessor. In large transactions, it is possible to obtain sub-
LIBOR pricing using commercial paper funding vehicles, and
private placements involving longer-term fixed interest rate
rental terms have also been consummated. The lessee's debt ser-
vice-equivalent rental payments are frequently interest-only pay-
ments, although they may include an amortization component
to the extent that the leased asset suffers true economic depreci-
ation over the life of the lease. The implicit interest rate embed-
ded in the periodic rental payment will generally match the dis-
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count factor used in calculating present value under SFAS's
Ninety Percent Test. Thus, that portion of the lessee's periodic
rental payments that are attributable to interest will have a zero
present value for purposes of the Ninety Percent Test.
In addition to the lessee's obligation to make periodic pay-
ments of rent, the lease typically will also include certain pay-
ment obligations of the lessee that must be performed at the end
of the lease term. In order to obtain the desired off-balance
sheet treatment, both the lessee's periodic rental payment obli-
gations and its end-of-term obligations must comply with the ac-
counting rules in SFAS 13. However, these end-of-term obliga-
tions can be designed to assure that the funding source receives
a recovery of its principal to the fullest extent permissible under
the accounting rules. The obligations of the lessee under the
lease to pay rent during the term of the lease and to make the
end-of-term payments based on the amounts that the lessor has
advanced can be analogized to the obligations of a borrower to
make, respectively, debt service payments during the term of the
loan and a balloon payment of unpaid principal at the end of
the loan term. However, unlike a borrower, the lessee's obliga-
tion to make the end-of-term payments must be limited in order
to comply with the accounting rules and, in particular, the
Ninety Percent Test set forth in SFAS 13.
At the end of the lease term, the lessee typically will be obli-
gated to perform one of two alternative obligations: either the
lessee must purchase the property at a fixed price equal to one
hundred percent of the aggregate unamortized amounts ad-
vanced by the lessor (the "purchase option") or must market the
property on behalf of the lessor and cause the property to be
sold to a third party buyer for a price equal to its fair market
value (the "sale option"). If the lessee has not duly performed
the obligations incident to the sale option and a sale of the prop-
erty to a third party has not been consummated by the end of
the lease term, then the lessee forfeits its right to exercise the
sale option and must exercise the purchase option. In addition,
if the lessee is ever in default under the lease, then the lessee
loses its right to exercise the sale option and the lessor has the
right to "accelerate" the lessee's obligation to purchase the prop-
erty pursuant to the purchase option. As indicated below, the
lessee may pledge collateral (other than the leased property) to
secure all or some portion of its end-of-term obligations.
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In the case of the purchase option, the lessee will purchase
the property for an amount equal to one hundred percent of the
amounts advanced by the lessor for acquisition costs and any ad-
ditional advances made by the lessor (such as for construction
costs, carrying costs, or transaction costs), less previous rental
payments attributable to amortization of principal. An appraisal
would be obtained at the inception of the transaction in order to
confirm that the purchase option price is not a bargain option
price (i.e., the amount to be paid would not be less than the
projected fair market value of the project at the end of the lease
term). Thus, if the lessee exercises the purchase option, the
lessee will be obligated to make payments to the lessor that will
make the lessor completely whole. The lessee usually has the
right to assign its option to purchase to any other person (so
long as the lessee is not relieved of its obligations). This is a
valuable right, as the ability to assign the option permits the
lessee to undertake a further synthetic lease financing with a new
lessor entity, whom the lessee would designate as its assignee.
The lessee could thus avoid taking the power generation facility
onto its books at the end of the lease term.
In the case of the sale option, the lessee typically agrees to
undertake to market the property to third parties during a speci-
fied marketing period for a price equal to the then-fair market
value of the property. If a third party buyer is identified and if
the purchase price paid by the buyer in connection with the sale
is less than one hundred percent of the outstanding lease bal-
ance, then the lessee is obligated to make certain supplemental
payments to the lessor. This payment obligation is usually re-
ferred to as the "residual value guaranty." Under the Ninety Per-
cent Test in SFAS 13, in order to avoid capital lease treatment,
the discounted present value of the "minimum lease payments"
owed by the lessee under the lease (i.e., both normal, periodic
rent payments and payments pursuant to the residual value guar-
anty) may not equal or exceed ninety percent of the fair market
value of the property determined as of the commencement of
the lease.54 Thus, the maximum amount payable under the
54. In practice, the maximum amount guaranteed by the lessee pursuant to the
residual value guaranty is normally in the range of 81-87% of the amounts advanced by
the funding source. This is because a number of the costs that are financed-such as
financing costs, transaction expenses, or other soft costs-may not be reflected in the
fair market value of the property. Thus, if the lessee's obligation to make the residual
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residual value guaranty will be structured so that, after taking
into account any previous rental payments attributable to amor-
tization of principal, the lease complies with this Ninety Percent
Test.
Because the residual value guaranty limits the lessee's liabil-
ity to less than ninety percent of the amount advanced by the
lessor, if the third party sale option is exercised, the lessor ac-
cordingly bears the residual risk that the value of the property
may drop below the unguaranteed portion of the amount ad-
vanced by the lessor. Thus, if the lessee's guaranty equaled
ninety percent of the amounts advanced by the lessor, the lessor
would bear the risk of loss resulting from the difference between
the ten percent "unguaranteed" portion of the aggregate
amount advanced and the price paid by the third party buyer. If
the aggregate amount advanced by the lessor was
US$100,000,000 and the property has declined in value to
US$15,000,000 by the end of the lease term, the lessor will re-
cover its entire US$100,000,000 investment if the third party sale
option is exercised, since the third party buyer will pay the
US$15,000,000 value and the lessee will pay US$85,000,000
under its residual value guaranty (this would represent eighty
five percent of the amounts advanced, which is within the Ninety
Percent Test). If the property has declined in value to
US$5,000,000 by the end of the lease term, however, the lessor
will not recover its entire US$100,000,000 investment if the third
party sale option is exercised, since the third party buyer will pay
the US$5,000,000 value and the lessee will pay only
US$90,000,000 of the US$95,000,000 deficiency under its
residual value guaranty (since a payment over US$90,000,000
would exceed the maximum amount payable under the Ninety
Percent Test). Thus, in this example, the lessor would bear the
risk of a US$5,000,000 loss (US$100,000,000 - [US$5,000,000
price plus US$90,000,000 residual value guaranty payment]).
Under the typical synthetic lease, regardless of whether the
value payment is expressed in terms of an obligation to pay a percentage of the
amounts advanced by the lessor, and if the amounts advanced by the lessor exceed the
fair market value of the property (because they include soft costs that do not translate
into an increase in the value of the property), the percentage of those costs that the
lessee is obligated to pay as part of its residual value guaranty must be reduced to less
than 90% to account for that fact. (For simplicity, this Essay presumes a 90% limita-
tion.)
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purchase option or sale option is exercised, the lessee receives
the benefit of any sale price for the property that exceeds the
amount advanced by the lessor. Thus, the lessee will have the
ability to retain any appreciation in the value of the property
over the lease term.
While nominally the transaction is in the form of a lease,
the lessor's (and other funding sources') willingness to enter
into the transaction is based upon an underwriting of (i) the
creditworthiness of the lessee or a parent corporation that pro-
vides a guaranty of the lease (since the lessee or the guarantor
will be obligated either to pay the purchase price for the leased
property, or to pay the residual value guaranty), (ii) the income-
producing potential of the leased property over the term of the
lease (as that income will be available to make rental payments,
which are attributable to interest and amortization), (iii) the
residual value risk that the limitations on the lessee's residual
value guaranty introduce, and (iv) the availability of collateral
(independent of the leased asset) to secure the lessee's obliga-
tions. In light of these underwriting considerations, a synthetic
lease can be viewed as a hybrid credit transaction involving ele-
ments of non-recourse project financing as well as recourse ele-
ments that depend in part on the creditworthiness of the lessee
or its parent and in part on the availability of independent collat-
eral.
VII. "A-B-C" SYNDICATION OF THE SYNTHETIC LEASE
Because the acquisition or construction costs involved with
a power generation facility will be substantial, a synthetic lease
involving a power generation facility is likely to be a syndicated
transaction, in which a group of different funding sources will
collectively provide the debt and equity needed for funding the
transaction.
The most common form for a syndication involves the for-
mation of a lessor entity organized as a trust and stratification of
the financing for the transaction into at least three separate
tranches: (1) the "A" tranche, representing the portion of the
transaction that is covered by the lessee's residual value guar-
anty, which can range up to an amount just less than ninety per-
cent, (2) the "C" tranche, representing the three percent mini-
mum required equity injection into the lessor under the consoli-
2001] 1105
1106 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.24:1083
dation rules, and (3) the "B" tranche, representing the
remainder, and which, together with the "C" tranche, must be
recovered exclusively from the proceeds of the sale of the leased
property if the lessee exercises the sale option.55 In the classic
"A-B-C" structure, the A, B, and C tranches represent 90%, 7%,
and 3% of the lease balance, respectively. The obligations of the
lessor entity in respect of the "C" tranche are represented by cer-
tificates of beneficial interest in the lessor entity, and the "A" and
"B" tranches are represented by evidence of indebtedness of the
lessor entity. The holders of "A," "B," and "C" tranches are fre-
quently commercial banks or their leasing company subsidiaries.
(Although the A-B-C structure is common, there is no require-
ment that the tranches must equal the ninety percent, seven per-
cent, and three percent amounts described above or that there
be three classes of interests. So long as a minimum subordinate
equity injection of three percent is made, the lessee's minimum
lease payments do not exceed the Ninety Percent Test in SFAS
13, and the other SFAS 13 tests are satisfied. Additionally, the
parties generally have the flexibility to structure the financing in
multiple tranches having varying priorities in the lessee's
residual value guaranty obligations and the assets pledged as se-
curity for the lease and financing.)
In a syndicated transaction, the lessor entity leases the prop-
erty to the lessee under terms similar to those described above
(i.e., pursuant to a "hell or high water," triple net lease, which
requires the lessee at the end of the lease term either to
purchase the property or to cause a third party to purchase it, in
which case the lessee is obligated under its residual value guar-
anty). The lessor assigns the lease to the participants and may
grant a deed of trust on its fee estate as security for its obliga-
tions to the participants.
55. As indicated above, the lessee's residual value guaranty must be pegged at less
than 90% and is typically in the 81%-87% range. If the residual value guaranty was
limited to 83% in an A-B-C transaction, the "A" tranche would equal 83%, the "B"
Tranche would equal 14%, and the "C" tranche would equal three percent.
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Classic "A-B-C" Syndication Structure Involving
Borrowing by a Lessor Entity
] Tranche "A" Participants
Agent Bank -- first priority in residual
value guaranty payments
Adviices 90% of Advances
S 97%
Tr$a7e " Tranche "B" Participants
Equity HoeCr Deed of Trust $ 7% of I- bear real estate risk that property
(Minimumn Advances value will decline to less than
3% of Advances/ 7% of aggregate amount
First Los Piece Position; advanced by all Participants; not
not covered by lessee's covered by lessee's residual value
residual value guarantee)
31% Plrante
vEnt $ Purchase Price Seller
for transaction
costs
Interest only rent payments;
End-of-term purchase price payment from Lessee or third party if
Lessee purchase option is exercised;End-of-term residual value guaranty payments capped at less than
[ 90% of lease balance if sale option is exercised
In the classic A-B-C format, the "A" tranche is designed to
have primary recourse to the lessee's residual value guaranty and
the "B" and "C" tranches are designed to have primary recourse
to the residual value of the leased property and thus bear the
risk of declines in the value of the property to below the amount
guaranteed by the lessee, with the "C" tranche bearing the first-
loss position of three percent. The return to which the investors
in the "A," "B," and "C" tranches will be entitled will reflect the
higher risk associated with the "B" and "C" positions.
Investment-grade companies seeking synthetic lease financ-
ing for a power generation facility may also consider utilizing
their creditworthiness to obtain better pricing for the "A" and
"B" tranches than might be available under the typical LIBOR-
based pricing offered by commercial banks. For transactions of
a sufficient size, these companies might seek to access the com-
mercial paper markets for the financing of certain tranches. A
group of commercial banks will need to provide liquidity backup
for the commercial paper. This type of transaction may also pro-
vide an alternative pricing mechanism so that the lessee has the
option at any time to elect to pay rent based upon either the
interest rate that the commercial paper issued under the pro-
gram would yield, LIBOR, or the prime rate.
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VIII. COLLATERALIZATION OF THE LESSEE'S OBLIGATIONS;
"SELF-FUNDING"
Independent collateral (other than the leased asset)-such
as Treasury securities, cash deposits, or the build-up of a cash
collateral "sinking fund" from excess project revenues over
time-can be used in synthetic lease transactions to achieve sev-
eral possible objectives. If Treasury securities or cash deposits
are pledged by the lessee, a bank or other regulated funding
source will be able to reduce the reserves and risk-weighted capi-
tal it must maintain for the transaction and may be prepared to
pass this savings along in the form of a lower interest rate for so
long as the collateral is maintained. Also, the funding source
might be prepared to underwrite a longer term for the transac-
tion or might be able to underwrite otherwise marginal lessee
credit if collateral other than the leased asset is pledged. Re-
gardless of the purpose for which the Treasury securities or cash
collateral has been posted, in order to obtain the desired off-
balance sheet treatment, the collateral can secure only the
lessee's obligations under the lease-even if one hundred per-
cent of the transaction is collateralized. Thus, if the lessee exer-
cises the third party sale option, the Treasury securities or cash
deposits can be used only to discharge the lessee's obligation to
make the residual value guaranty payment (less than 90%) and
will not be available to cover any remaining unpaid lease bal-
ance. (To the extent the collateral is actually employed to dis-
charge the lessee's residual value obligation, of course, the full
residual value of the leased property would be available as a
source for the repayment of the unguaranteed tranches.) More-
over, in construction transactions, the accounting rules do not
permit the lessee to deposit cash collateral directly with the les-
sor or lenders during the construction period, although the
pledge of collateral to a third party trustee during the construc-
tion period may be permissible.56
Lessees that are cash-rich or that have significant investment
portfolios may still desire to obtain the accounting benefits of a
synthetic lease even though they may not necessarily need to
raise financing from outside sources to acquire or hold an asset.
For these types of companies, a "self-funded" transaction can be
56. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Emerging Issues Task Force, 97-10,
§ 9(a) (1998).
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explored, where the lessee, in effect, will purchase all or a por-
tion of the Tranche A interest in the lease facility and thereby
use its own funds to provide a significant part of the financing.
The portion held by the lessee may bear a nominal-or even a
zero-rate of interest. It would still be necessary, however, to
place the Tranche B and Tranche C interests with true third par-
ties in order to preserve the desired accounting treatment. In
addition, outside financing would need to be obtained even for
the Tranche A position during the construction period for the
asset.
57
IX. SYNTHETIC LEASES AND SALE-LEASEBACKS
Under SFAS 98, a lease of real property resulting from a sale
of that asset by the seller-lessee and leaseback of the asset to the
seller-lessee can be booked as a sale of the asset and an operat-
ing lease only if (i) the lease is a "normal leaseback" without con-
tinuing involvement in the leased asset by the seller-lessee that
would result in the seller-lessee not transferring the risks or re-
wards of ownership of the leased property to the buyer-lesser
("continuing involvement" would include an obligation or option
on the part of the seller-lessee to repurchase the property or a
guarantee of the buyer-lessor's investment or a return on that
investment for a limited or extended period of time) and (ii) the
lease contains payment terms and provisions that adequately
demonstrate the buyer-lessor's initial and continuing investment
in the property. Because the lessee's purchase option and
residual value guaranty under a synthetic lease will comprise
"continuing involvement," synthetic leases cannot be structured
using previously-owned improvements, and instead are consum-
mated in connection with the acquisition of new sites or for-
merly leased locations.
It is possible, however, in the case of unimproved land
owned by a putative lessee to structure a transaction involving a
ground lease of that land to a synthetic lessor and a lease back of
that land to a lessee as part of the synthetic lease. This type of
ground lease/synthetic leaseback structure can offer significant
benefits, in that (i) the lessee needs to raise financing only for
the construction of improvements, (ii) through the retention of
the lessor's interest under the ground lease, the lessee retains
57. Id.
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long-term control over the site, and (iii) by eliminating the land
value as part of the leased asset, the lessee may position itself
more readily to refinance the initial synthetic lease with addi-
tional synthetic leases going forward, without distortions to the
accounting tests that appreciation in the land value may intro-
duce. Some of these aspects relating to refinancing the synthetic
lease are described more fully below.
X. LESSEE INVOLVEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE
LEASED ASSET
FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force issued a pronounce-
ment in 1998, EITF 97-10, that concerns the effect of lessee in-
volvement in the construction of an asset on the accounting clas-
sification of a lease. This pronouncement addresses such fea-
tures as lessee construction completion guarantees, the lessee
acting as the general contractor or agent for construction, the
lessee having the obligation to fund cost overruns, and lessee
indemnification for construction period risks. Under these
rules, a lessee will be considered to be the owner of an asset dur-
ing the construction period if the lessee has substantially all of
the construction period risks. (For accounting purposes, note
that the term of the lease does not commence until the comple-
tion of construction or commencement of occupancy by the
lessee.)58 If the lessee is considered the owner of the asset dur-
ing the construction period, the lessee's commencement of oc-
cupancy of the constructed asset pursuant to the lease following
completion of construction will be considered a sale-leaseback,
which will fail to satisfy the requirements for operating lease
treatment under SFAS 98.
EITF 97-10 sets forth certain rules for determining whether
the lessee has substantially all of the construction period risks
and, therefore, should be considered the owner of the project
during the construction period. Under the "Maximum Guar-
anty Test," the lessee will be considered the owner of the project
during the construction period if at any point during the con-
struction period, the sum of
58. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Emerging Issues Task Force, 97-10,
§ 4 (1998).
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(a) the "accreted" value of any project costs previously
made by the lessee, 9 plus
(b) the present value of the maximum amount of project
costs the lessee can be required to pay as of that point
in time,
is ninety percent or more of the total project costs incurred to
date (excluding land acquisition costs, if any).60 Probability is
not considered in the Maximum Guaranty Test. Thus, a transac-
tion in which the lessee provides a full guaranty of completion or
a guaranty to pay all cost overruns will not qualify for off-balance
sheet treatment.
Under Sections 6 and 7 of EITF 97-10, the "project costs"
that are included in the Maximum Guaranty Test include:
(a) lease payments that must be made regardless of when
or whether the project is complete (a "date-certain"
lease),
(b) payments under guarantees of the construction fi-
nancing,
(c) equity investments (or an obligation to make equity
investments) in the owner-lessor,
(d) loans or advances made to the owner-lessor or any par-
ty related to the owner-lessors, including time deposits
pledged to the owner-lessor as security for the Lessee's
obligation,
(e) payments made by the Lessee in the capacity of a de-
veloper, a general contractor, or a construction man-
ager/agent that are reimbursed less frequently than is
customary,
(f) primary or secondary obligations to pay project costs
under construction contracts,
(g) an obligation to purchase the real estate project under
any circumstances,
59. The project costs paid by the lessee are "accreted" (i.e., their value grows over
time) based on the same discount rate that is used by the lessee to determine the net
present value of the minimum lease payments under the Ninety Percent Test for pur-
poses of SFAS 13 if that rate is known; otherwise the applicable construction borrowing
rate is used. Id. at § 5.
60. Id.
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(h) an obligation to fund construction cost overruns, and
(i) rent, transaction costs, or fees of any kind paid during
the construction period.
Project costs do not include "normal tenant improvements."
EITF 97-10 expressly excludes from "normal tenant improve-
ments" all structural elements, electrical wiring, HVAC systems,
and elevators.
EITF 97-10 also sets forth certain additional indicia of pro-
ject ownership by the lessee during the construction period,
apart from the Maximum Guaranty Test. If these indicia of pro-
ject ownership are present in a given transaction, the lessee will
be deemed to own the project during the construction period
and the subsequent lease will be a sale-leaseback, which will fail
to satisfy the requirements for operating lease treatment under
SFAS 98. These indicia include the following:
(a) direct responsibility on the part of the lessee to pay
any cost of the project other than pursuant to a "com-
mitted" right of reimbursement (note that a right of
reimbursement may not be considered "committed" if
the funds can be withheld for any reason other than
misappropriation, willful misconduct, or bankruptcy
on the part of the lessee),
(b) indemnification for preexisting environmental risks
that are more than remote,
(c) lessee indemnities in favor of any party other than the
owner-lessor or for third-party claims not caused by
the lessee's own actions or failures to act, and
(d) if the lessee owns the land, construction commences
before the lessee has ground leased the land to the
synthetic lessor.61
EITF 97-10 has resulted in a number of structural changes
in synthetic leases of assets to be constructed. As a result of the
Maximum Guaranty Test, during the construction period all
rent, carrying costs, and transaction costs must be capitalized
and cash collateral cannot be directly held by the lessor. The
lessee must have a "committed" right of reimbursement in place
pursuant to the lease before it incurs project costs. In addition,
61. Id. at §§ 6 and 7.
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"self funding," in which the lessee holds the Tranche A position,
is not available during the construction period and lessees can-
not provide full guaranties of completion or against cost over-
runs.
The typical "post 97-10" synthetic lease will approach the
construction period risks of delay, failure to complete, and cost
overruns with provisions that, while not obligating the lessee to
pay all project costs or complete by the scheduled completion
date (for that would violate the Maximum Guaranty Test), pro-
vide incentives and disincentives for the on-time, on-budget
completion of the project. Thus, if cost overruns are incurred or
the project cannot be completed on-time, then (unless the lessor
agrees to increase its funding commitment or to extend the
completion date to address these problems) the lease will re-
quire the lessee at that time either to exercise the purchase op-
tion for one hundred percent of the lease balance or to "walk
away" from the project (i.e., terminate the lease), forfeit its
purchase option, and pay an amount that is defined to equal the
maximum amount that the lessee may pay under the Maximum
Guaranty Test. This amount will be equal to 89.9% of the "pro-
ject costs" incurred to date, less the accreted value of any project
costs previously made by the lessee. (To avoid the reduction in
the lessor's recovery that would result under the Maximum
Guaranty Test from the accretion of project costs paid directly by
the lessee, the lease documentation normally will prohibit the
lessee from paying any project costs directly, and will require all
project costs to be funded exclusively through advances by the
lessor.)
Under Emergency Issues Task Force 00-13, "integral equip-
ment" is considered real estate for purposes of lease classifica-
tion. If the lessee makes a payment towards the purchase of inte-
gral equipment (which, in the case of a power plant, may in-
clude equipment such as turbines) in connection with the
construction of a plant before it has a "committed" right of reim-
bursement, its ability to maintain off-balance sheet treatment for
the plant will be compromised.62
62. See Healey, supra note 37.
[T]he key is to get the synthetic lease structure in place before any payments
of any kind have been made on the project, and since the long lead time from
turbine order time to delivery time has now grown to as much as three years,
the financing begins prior to the order being placed. It is often done before
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XI. ADDRESSING INVESTOR RISKS
Investors interested in providing funding in the form of syn-
thetic leases are concerned with the potential scenario under
which the lessee exercises the third party sale option and causes
the property to be sold to a third party for less than the amount
not covered by the residual value guaranty. It is customary for
numerous hurdles to be imposed upon the lessee's exercise of
the third party sale option, such as burdensome notice provi-
sions, conditions relating to the lack of any default, or condi-
tions relating to the requirement for maintenance of the asset
and requiring the price to be no less than the asset's fair market
value. These conditions may make the exercise of this option
unattractive or may simply make it easy for the lessee to "trip up"
in attempting to exercise the sale option. These conditions will
not necessarily affect the viability of the sale option from an ac-
counting standpoint. In addition, the lender will usually expect
an appraisal to be obtained, at the inception of the transaction,
which indicates that the fair market value of the property, as of
the expiration of the lease term, will exceed the unguaranteed
residual amount at risk by a substantial coverage factor (such as
3:1). Additionally, in construction projects, it is not uncommon
to find features that are designed to deal with the construction
risks introduced by EITF 97-10 and that require the lessee to ex-
ercise its purchase option. The lessee can also "walk away" and
pay the maximum amount payable under the Maximum Guar-
anty Test based on "hair trigger" determinations that cost over-
runs may be incurred or that the project may not be complete by
the scheduled completion date.
In a synthetic lease for a power generation facility, it may be
possible to enhance the security for the lessee's obligations with
respect to some or all of the tranches of financing by folding
into the transaction structure some of the types of collateral and
revenue streams that have traditionally been used to credit-en-
hance project finance transactions. Thus, to the extent that
some portion of a merchant power plant's output has been sold
the sites for plants have been selected, which results in somewhat of a leap of
faith from bankers who are not privy to make decisions based on the lengthy
due diligence process which accompanies more traditional deals. It does how-
ever guarantee that an off balance sheet financing can be done and offers
flexibility for the specifics to be worked out down the road.
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to a purchaser under a long-term power purchase agreement, a
portion of the financing might be structured to have the primary
security interest in the rights to payment to which the lessee is
entitled under that agreement. To the extent that a merchant
plant generates revenues in excess of the periodic rental pay-
ments, the lessee might be required to set aside reserves for fuel,
scheduled maintenance, unanticipated maintenance, and future
rent or residual value guaranty payments before it is allowed to
distribute those excess revenues to its investors. The lessee of
the plant might be established as a single purpose, bankruptcy-
remote entity in order to insulate the financing sources from the
risk of a bankruptcy triggered by problems with other assets or
businesses of the lessee group, with the credit support for the
transaction provided through a guaranty of that entity's obliga-
tions given by its creditworthy parent entity.
Depending on the structure of the transaction, investors
may bear certain environmental risks or other risks of property
ownership. These are covered by special lessee indemnification
obligations, although in construction projects those indemnifica-
tion obligations must be deferred until after the construction pe-
riod except for limited indemnities for the lessee's own acts that
are permissible under EITF 97-10.
A synthetic lease transaction involves certain legal issues and
risks relating to characterization, since the lease may be viewed,
either in bankruptcy, in a default proceeding, or for other pur-
poses (such as compliance with applicable state usury laws), as a
disguised mortgage.63 Parties that enter into these transactions
should understand that the lease may be treated for legal or
bankruptcy purposes as a mortgage. 64 The lease documents may
even include language granting to the lessor a mortgage on the
lessee's interest in the property and other lender remedies, in-
cluding, in deed of trust states, a power of sale. Moreover, in
transactions involving one or more tranches of debt, the lessee
itself might deliver a guaranty of the lessor entity's obligations to
the funding source (again capped by an amount sufficient to
comply with the SFAS Ninety Percent Test), in order to attempt
63. See John C. Murray, Off-Balance-Sheet Financing: Synthetic Leases, 32 REAL PROP.
PRO. & TR. J. 193 (1997); Thomas R. Fileti, Real Estate Off-Balance Sheet Financing (Syn-
thetic Leasing) 418 PLI/Real 1021 (Order No. N4-4603), 1997.
64. Bruce H. White et al., Recharacterization of Synthetic Leases: How a Lease Becomes a
Secured Claim, 1999 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (Nov. 1999).
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to address concerns relating to the rejectability of a lease in a
bankruptcy proceeding. In states such as California, which limit
deficiency judgments or impose procedural hurdles upon the re-
covery of deficiency judgments, characterization of the transac-
tion as a mortgage for state law purposes will impose a number
of substantive and procedural limitations on the ability of the
lessor or lender to recover the "guaranteed" portion of the trans-
action and may require the lessor or lender to look to the real
property first for satisfaction of the lessee's obligations before
pursuing a deficiency judgment against the lessee, which, if ob-
tained, might be executed against other unencumbered assets.65
XII. LEASE MODIFICATIONS; UNWINDING OR REFINANCINGTHE SYNTHETIC LEASE
Since synthetic leases typically are entered into for a me-
dium term, the lessee must plan for the need to "refinance" or
otherwise retire the synthetic lease at its expiration date. That
refinancing or repayment can occur through (i) an extension of
the term of the synthetic lease then in effect, perhaps with modi-
fications to financial or other covenants, (ii) the sale of the
leased property to the lessee pursuant to its purchase option, or
(iii) the transfer of the property to a new purchaser designated
by the lessee, with whom the lessee would intend to enter into a
new operating or synthetic lease.6 6
One of the problems associated with unwinding or refinanc-
ing a synthetic lease transaction, if the lessee intends to continue
an off-balance sheet arrangement with respect to the leased as-
set, arises because the new lease arrangement resulting from ei-
ther a modification of the existing lease or a new lease will re-
65. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 580(a), 580(d), 726 (commonly known as the "fair
value," "anti-deficiency," and "one-form-of-action" rules).
66. A true sale to a third party, in which the lessee does not continue as the syn-
thetic lessee under a new synthetic lease-either because the lessee no longer intends
to use the premises or because the lessee intends to remain in occupancy under an
operating lease that will be regarded as such both for tax and accounting purposes-
will have tax consequences to the lessee, as the sale will be treated as a sale for income
tax purposes, and thus could trigger gain if the price paid exceeds the lessee's basis and
to the extent depreciation must be recaptured under Internal Revenue Code Section
1245 or 1250. While these tax consequences may be expected in the case of a complete
divestiture by the lessee, they may be more surprising in the situation where the lessee
retains an interest in the property under a lease characterized as an operating lease
both for tax and for accounting purposes.
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quire a new analysis as to whether that new arrangement consti-
tutes a capital lease or an operating lease under SFAS 13.
If the value of the leased asset has increased over the term
of the initial lease transaction and the new lease transaction is
intended to involve simply a refinancing of the existing lease bal-
ance under the existing lease arrangement with no increase in
the amount financed, the lease might violate the bargain option
test under SFAS 13, because the lessee would have the right, in
the new lease transaction, to purchase the property based on the
amount financed in the initial synthetic lease even though the
fair market value of the property at the time the new lease is
entered into has increased beyond that level. The potential for
appreciation in the value of the leased asset thus represents an
impediment to the ability to maintain the property off-balance
sheet over a long term.
One way to address this risk is to structure the initial lease
(or subsequent leases) so that they involve a lease of improve-
ments or equipment only, and do not involve a lease of land, as
improvements and equipment will depreciate in economic value
over time, whereas the land component typically involves the po-
tential for appreciation in value. This structure would involve a
ground lease of the land to the lessor and ownership of the im-
provements and equipment by the lessor. The improvements
and equipment would be leased and the land would be sub-
leased to the synthetic lessee. The purchase option of the lessee
under the synthetic lease would involve the option to purchase
the improvements and to step into the shoes of the lessor as the
lessee under the ground lease. The rent payable under the
ground lease would need to be a fair market ground rent so that
the purchase option of the lessee to acquire the ground lessee's
interest would not be viewed as involving an option to acquire
the interest in the ground lease at a below-market rate. This can
be handled by including in the ground lease periodic rental ad-
justment requirements so that the rent under the ground lease is
reset at fair rental value from time to time, and thus would not
represent at any time a bargain rent.
Another challenge that must be addressed in the context of
refinancing the synthetic lease is whether the refinancing or re-
payment of the synthetic lease will introduce transaction costs
that might be substantial. These costs might include documen-
tary or similar transfer taxes on the transfer of the interest in the
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land or improvements by the lessor to the purchaser (whether
the lessee or the lessor under a new synthetic lease) and sales tax
on the sale of equipment or other personal property by the les-
sor to the purchaser (again, whether the lessee or the lessor
under the new synthetic lease). With structuring, some of these
costs might be avoided. For example, if the lessor entity is a
trust, it might be possible, in certain jurisdictions, to avoid cer-
tain of these costs by structuring the transfer not as a direct
transfer of the leased asset, but rather as a transfer of the benefi-
cial interests in the trust.
XIII. SPECIAL ISSUES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF POWER
GENERATION FACILITIES
Although synthetic leases may provide power project spon-
sors with several advantages over more conventional forms of
project finance, they also carry certain limitations and present
special issues or complications when used to finance the acquisi-
tion or development of power generation facilities.
One limitation presented by synthetic leases as compared
with other forms of project finance is their tenor. As the exam-
ples discussed above illustrate, synthetic lease financings tend to
have a shorter term than traditional project financings, which
can have a term of twenty years or more. The trend toward
shorter-term project debt also has coincided with the movement
of the electricity markets over the past several years away from
long-term power sales contracts and toward a short term or
"spot" market power sales by merchant or quasi-merchant plants.
If the de-regulation problems experienced in California surface
in other jurisdictions and fossil fuel costs continue to rise, finan-
cial institutions and public and private bulk power purchasers
will become more wary of the market risks. Accordingly, the
pendulum could again swing toward longer-term power sales ar-
rangements as a hedge against market risk and increasing power
production costs. This, in turn, could re-invigorate the demand
for longer-term project debt.
Another issue concerns the collateral package supporting
the financing. Project financings depend on a complete collat-
eral package, which includes the plant and all of its tangible and
intangible assets, including all contract rights, permits, accounts,
and other assets. In a power generation project, the assets neces-
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sary to make the project work would typically include intangible
property, such as critical project contracts, including fuel supply
and transportation agreements, energy sales agreements, if
any,67 and interconnection and transmission agreements," as
well as permits, licenses, and other governmental approvals that
are necessary to operate the power plant. These project con-
tracts and permits usually are not freely transferable or assigna-
ble. For example, although the assignment provisions of a given
energy sales agreement may allow assignment to an affiliate of
the project company or a collateral assignment to the project
lenders, such provisions usually require the counterparty's con-
sent for transfer to an unaffiliated entity. To the extent a syn-
thetic lease financing requires a transfer of the project assets to a
party (the lessor entity), the project sponsor or acquirer may
have to obtain the counterparty's consent. Having to request
such consent after the deal has been negotiated places the pro-
ject sponsor or acquirer in a difficult bargaining position and
may allow the counterparty to extract concessions. In order to
preserve to the fullest extent the ability to finance the project on
an off-balance sheet basis, the project sponsor should attempt, in
negotiating project contracts, to include broad language in the
assignment provision permitting assignments as required to
enter into a synthetic lease.
67. Until recently, it has been fairly common for even "merchant" plants to enter
into bi-lateral contracts for the sale of a certain portion of their electric or thermal
energy output in order to support the revenue projections and facilitate financing. For
example, Calpine's Pasadena Power Station sells a significant amount of energy to Phil-
lips Petroleum, which owns the project site. See CIT Funds Calpine, PROJ. FIN. INT'L,
Sept. 20, 2000, at 21. During the past few years an increasing number of "pure"
merchant plants have been developed, which rely entirely on spot market transactions.
It remains to be seen whether sure "pure" merchant plants will continue to be devel-
oped at the same pace in light of the de-regulation experience in California, where the
new legislation again authorizes the creation of bi-lateral, long-term power sales agree-
ments with generators as a price stabilization mechanism. On February 1, 2001, the
California legislature passed a bill providing the necessary funding for the California
Department of Water Resources to enter into long-term contracts for the purchase of
energy for electric customers in California. CA A.B. la, 1st Extra. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
68. "Interconnection Agreements" between the project company and the local dis-
tribution company govern the operation and maintenance of equipment and facilities
by which the plant is physically connected to the local distribution company's electrical
system. "Transmission" or "wheeling" agreements set forth the pricing and other terms
and conditions of the transmission service or transportation of power generated by the
plant over the electrical transmission system of one or more electric distribution com-
panies to purchasers at distant locations.
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A similar problem arises with respect to the critical permits
already in the name of the project sponsor. Once issued, such
permits typically are not freely transferable. This could require
the project sponsor or seller to make a filing with the applicable
agency, comply with certain notice and procedural requirements
and in some cases provide detailed financial and organizational
information about the transferee. There is also a risk that this
re-opening of the permitting process could result in the imposi-
tion of additional or different conditions based on changed cir-
cumstances or legal requirements since the permit was issued.
A further issue concerning the use of a synthetic lease may
arise when the project sponsor has already incurred significant
development or construction costs prior to financing. Sponsors
of power projects often undertake significant activity in the
name of the project company or proposed lessee during the de-
velopment and construction period prior to financing. Power
projects in particular are characterized by long development pe-
riods during which the project sponsor undertakes a variety of
pre-financing activities, such as acquiring land rights, negotiat-
ing key project contracts, including fuel supply, energy sales,
transmission and interconnection agreements, and obtaining
permits, including conditional land use permits and air permits
needed before construction can begin. If the development of
the project has been costly or takes a long time, there is a risk
that the soft development costs incurred by the sponsor (without
a right of reimbursement) with respect to which such pre-con-
struction or pre-financing activities may create problems under
EITF 97-10 for the subsequent ability to finance the asset
through a synthetic lease.69 While it may be possible to avoid
these accounting problems by transferring the project's assets to
an unrelated entity at the time the synthetic lease is arranged,
such a transfer may raise the same transferability problems noted
above regarding permits and key project contracts in connection
with acquisitions of existing power plants.
Further, as with any innovative financing technique that is
based on tax and accounting rules and their interpretation,
there is a risk of challenges or changes in law, regulation, or ap-
plicable accounting rules.
69. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Although the fate of energy de-regulation remains uncer-
tain, demand for additional power generation capacity in the
United States continues to surge. The boom in power project
development has already created a need for new sources of capi-
tal and innovative project finance structures to meet the chal-
lenges of the rapidly changing energy market.
No one financing structure, no matter how new or innova-
tive, is a panacea. Despite their complicated nature and inher-
ent limitations imposed by the accounting rules, synthetic leases
may be a project financing structure worthy of further considera-
tion by power project developers and lenders exploring new
sources of capital. The favorable tax and accounting treatment
that synthetic leases offer may provide a valuable competitive
edge to players in a maturing power game, as they confront the
multiple challenges of containing financing costs, preserving eq-
uity, enhancing earnings, and maintaining balance sheets that
will preserve their options to participate in a dynamic market
where there is much demand for the development of new power
plants.
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